1Password

Vault contents are genuinely inaccessible to 1Password via end-to-end encryption — a real architectural guarantee — but outside the vault, substantial usage, diagnostic, and behavioural data is collected for product improvement and marketing purposes.

Vault contents can only be handed to law enforcement in encrypted form — a genuine protection. But outside the vault, data flows to marketing partners in ways the policy itself acknowledges may legally constitute a 'sale or sharing' under US privacy laws, and corporate affiliate sharing is broad.

Good rights framework — download, delete, object, restrict, withdraw consent — and product usage data is opt-in. The main gap is vague retention language that applies to almost everything outside the vault, and marketing tracking defaults require active management via the Cookie Policy.

Strong E2E encryption architecture with a Trust Center and detailed changelog — but Canadian jurisdiction means Five Eyes applies, legitimate interests is invoked broadly, and there are no specific security certifications or audit cycles named in the privacy policy itself.